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Abstract
Prevailing fingerprint recognition systems are vulnera-
ble to spoof attacks. To mitigate these attacks, automated
spoof detectors are trained to distinguish a set of live or
bona fide fingerprints from a set of known spoof finger-
prints. Despite their success, spoof detectors remain vul-
nerable when exposed to attacks from spoofs made with ma-
terials not seen during training of the detector. To alleviate
this shortcoming, we approach spoof detection as a one-
class classification problem. The goal is to train a spoof
detector on only the live fingerprints such that once the con-
cept of “live” has been learned, spoofs of any material can
be rejected. We accomplish this through training multiple
generative adversarial networks (GANS) on live fingerprint
images acquired with the open source, dual-camera, 1900
ppi RaspiReader fingerprint reader. Our experimental re-
sults, conducted on 5.5K spoof images (from 12 materials)
and 11.8K live images show that the proposed approach im-
proves the cross-material spoof detection performance over
state-of-the-art one-class and binary class spoof detectors
on 11 of 12 testing materials and 7 of 12 testing materials,
respectively.
1. Introduction
Automated fingerprint identification systems continue to
proliferate into many different domains around the globe,
including forensics, border crossing security, national ID
systems, and mobile device access and payments [1]. While
these systems have become widely accepted due to their ac-
curacy, speed, and purported security, many studies have
shown that the systems are highly vulnerable to spoof at-
tacks [2, 3]. Successfully carrying out a spoof attack can be
as simple as 2D printing with conductive ink to replicate the
fingerprint of a victim left behind on their keyboard.
Due to the magnitude of this security flaw existing in
many prevailing fingerprint recognition systems, automated
spoof detection systems utilizing both hardware and soft-
ware have been developed over the last several decades with
Figure 1. Example spoof artifacts. Spoof attack materials have a
large variety of both optical and mechanical properties. As such,
many spoof detectors which are trained on some subset of spoofs
tend to fail to detect spoofs made from materials not seen during
training.
the goal of automatically detecting and flagging spoof at-
tacks1 prior to performing biometric authentication2. Hard-
ware based approaches to spoof detection involve adding
additional sensors to the fingerprint reader with the goal of
capturing features such as heartbeat, thermal output, blood
flow, odor, and sub-dermal fingerprints better able to distin-
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fZJI_BrMZXU
2The IARPA ODIN program is an ongoing US government initiative
aimed at developing robust spoof detection systems. https://www.
iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/odin
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guish live fingerprints from spoof fingerprints [4]. In con-
trast to hardware based approaches, software based solu-
tions do not require additional sensors. Rather, they extract
textural, anatomical, physiological, or learned [5] features
from the same image which is to be used for biometric au-
thentication. These features are then used to train a classi-
fier to separate live fingerprints from spoof fingerprints [4].
Most all spoof detectors, whether hardware based or
purely software based, make the assumption that spoof de-
tection is a binary, closed-set problem (i.e. live or spoof).
In reality, because spoofs can be fabricated using many dif-
ferent materials with different optical and mechanical prop-
erties (Fig. 1), spoof detection is an open-set classification
problem with an unknown number of “spoof” classes. In-
deed, several studies have shown up to a three-fold increase
in error when testing spoof detectors with spoofs made from
“unseen” materials [6, 7].
Some ongoing studies [8, 9] have attempted to address
the cross-material failures of spoof detectors by explicitly
approaching spoof detection as an open-set classification
problem using novel material detection [8] or one-class
classification [9]. Although, these studies do not meet the
requirements for field deployments with error rates in ac-
cess of 20% we are motivated by the tremendous potential
of the one-class classification approach in [9]. In partic-
ular, one-class classification offers the following main ad-
vantages over binary classifiers (2-class) in the context of
fingerprint spoof detection:
1. Only live samples are needed for training the detec-
tor. This eliminates the arduous task of fabricating
and imaging a large number of spoof impressions from
multiple materials.
2. One-class classifiers do not overfit to spoof impres-
sions of a particular material during training (as bi-
nary classifiers are prone to) (Fig. 2) such that the
cross-material performance decreases. Indeed, one-
class classifiers only learn what constitutes a live fin-
gerprint and do not use spoof impressions of any spe-
cific material or subsets of materials during training.
Given the above advantages of one-class classification
in comparison to binary classification within the context of
spoof detection, we identify and rectify several significant
limitations of previous approaches in reformulating finger-
print spoof detection into a one-class classification problem.
(i) First, Ding and Ross [9] were extracting features from
processed FTIR3 images to model the distribution of live
3Frustrated Total Internal Reflection (FTIR) is the optical phenomena
used by fingerprint readers to capture light reflected back only from finger-
print ridges, enabling capture of a high contrast fingerprint image. The raw
FTIR images (Fig. 3b) are processed (RGB to grayscale, contrast enhance-
ment, perspective correction) into processed FTIR images to improve fin-
gerprint matching performance. Direct-view images (Fig. 3a) capture light
reflected back from the entire fingerprint area (ridges and valleys).
Figure 2. Toy example of both two-class (training with both live
and spoof) and one-class (training with only live) spoof detectors.
(a) A spoof detector trained as a binary classifier is prone to over-
fitting to “known materials” seen during training. An “unknown
spoof” made from a material not seen during training may still fall
far from the live distribution but be incorrectly classified based
on the learned decision boundary. (b) In contrast, the one-class
classifier learns a tight decision boundary around the live samples
correctly classifies all of the spoofs (none of which have been seen
during training).
samples. However, as shown by Engelsma et al. in [10]
features extracted from processed FTIR images can be very
similar for both live and spoof fingerprint images in com-
parison to RGB raw FTIR (Fig. 3b) and direct-view im-
ages (Fig. 3a). (ii) The features extracted in [9] were hand-
crafted textural features whereas recent research [11, 5] in-
dicates that learned deep features are able to better dis-
criminate between live and spoof fingerprints. (iii) Ade-
quately modeling the live fingerprint distribution (necessary
for robust one-class classification using only live samples
for training) requires a diverse and large number of live
samples. However, the number of live impressions in the
(a) (b)
Figure 3. Example RaspiReader live impression images. By
mounting two cameras at different angles to a glass prism,
RaspiReader captures (a) a RGB direct-view image of the finger
in contact with the platen; (b) a RGB raw frustrated total inter-
nal reflection (FTIR) fingerprint. Both 1900 ppi images contain
complementary information useful for spoof detection. Figure re-
trieved from [13].
Figure 4. RaspiReader: (a) A prototype of the 4-inch cube
RaspiReader (Match in Box model); (b) Internal view of the
RaspiReader showing the ubiquitous, low-cost ($400) compo-
nents. Both cameras are marked with red boxes. Figure retrieved
from [13].
LiveDet datasets is relatively small with only 2,000 train-
ing impressions (from 81 - 400 fingers of 22 -100 subjects
depending on the sensor) collected in a single laboratory
environment [12].
In this paper, we address the aforementioned limita-
tions in [9] to improve cross material spoof detection per-
formance. First, we use a RaspiReader fingerprint reader
(Fig. 4) [10, 13] which uses two cameras to simultaneously
capture both a direct-view image and a raw FTIR finger-
print image at 1900 ppi (Fig. 3). Using the RaspiReader, we
collect a large, diverse dataset comprised of 11,880 live fin-
gerprint impressions from nearly 6,000 unique fingers and
5,531 spoof finger impressions from 12 different materials
(Fig. 1). It should be noted that this dataset is significantly
larger and more diverse in terms of number of subjects, fin-
gers, materials, and collection locations than any reported
LiveDet datasets (585 subjects vs. 100 subjects, 5,800 fin-
gers vs. 400 fingers, 12 materials vs. 6 materials, and 3
locations vs. 1 location). Although we tie our spoof detec-
tor specifically to RaspiReader, we note that most existing
state-of-the-art spoof detection algorithms are also “reader
specific” since they require re-training for each individual
fingerprint reader given the different textural characteristics
from one reader to another4.
Next, we train three Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) on each of the complementary images [10] output
by the RaspiReader (raw FTIR image, processed FTIR im-
age, and direct-view image) (Fig. 5). For each GAN, (i) The
generator attempts to synthesize live fingerprint images. (ii)
The discriminator is fed the generator’s synthesized live fin-
gerprints and also real live fingerprint images. (iii) The gen-
erator learns to synthesize better live fingerprint images as
it attempts to fool the discriminator, and the discriminator
learns to distinguish between real live fingerprints and syn-
thesized live fingerprints. Our hypothesis is that the fea-
tures learned by the discriminator to separate real live fin-
gerprints from synthesized live fingerprints can also be used
during testing to distinguish live fingerprints from spoof fin-
gerprints.
After training all three GANS, the generator is discarded
and the sigmoid output (probability of an input image being
a real live sample) of each discriminator acts as a “spoof-
ness” score. The fusion of the scores output by all three of
the discriminators constitutes the final spoofness score of an
input fingerprint sample.
More concisely, the contributions of this work are:
1. The collection (using RaspiReader) of a challenging
dataset of 12 different spoof materials and over 11.8K
live fingerprints from nearly 6,000 unique fingers.
2. A new “open-set” spoof detector (i.e. we make no as-
sumptions about the characteristics of spoofs during
training). Instead we learn the concept of a live finger-
print such that spoofs of all materials can be rejected.
This algorithm is realized using the discriminators of
three GANs trained on only live fingerprint images.
3. Experimental evaluation demonstrating the superior
performance of our algorithm on this dataset compared
to baseline [9, 10] algorithms.
4The IARPA ODIN program has specified the Crossmatch Guardian
and the Lumidigm as baseline fingerprint readers for software solutions.
Figure 5. Flow diagram of the proposed one-class fingerprint spoof detector. A GAN is trained for each image output of RaspiReader (raw
FTIR, processed FTIR, and direct-view). The generator aims to synthesize live fingerprints and the discriminator learns features which
separate real live fingerprints from the generator’s synthesized live fingerprints. During testing, the features extracted by each discriminator
from test images are passed to a sigmoid classification layer to classify the images as live or spoof. The decisions of the three models are
fused together by score level fusion.
Table 1. Summary of Spoof Dataset (# Impressions per Material)
Dragonskin Ecoflex Gelatin
Monster
Latex
Crayola
Magic
Pigmented
Ecoflex
Playdoh Woodglue
Body
Latex
2D
Paper
Trans-
parency
Gold
Finger
96 605 161 741 360 1040 348 501 861 556 50 212
Table 2. Summary of Live Dataset
Collection Location # Subjects1 # Impressions2
Michigan State University 55 3,050
Clarkson University 122 1,219
Johns Hopkins APL 408 7,611
Total 585 11,880
1 10 fingers per subject
2 1-5 impressions per finger
2. Approach
In this section, we (i) provide more details on our dataset,
(ii) explain how images are preprocessed via region of inter-
est (ROI) extraction prior to training three GAN networks,
(iii) provide details on the architecture and training proce-
dure for each of the GAN networks, and finally, (iv) discuss
our fusion technique.
2.1. Dataset
The dataset used in our experiments consists of 5,531
spoof images from 12 different spoof materials (Table 1).
Additionally, we have collected 11,880 live fingerprint im-
pressions from over 500 unique subjects (Table 2). In order
to most closely mimic a “real world” scenario, the live fin-
gerprint impressions were captured in three different loca-
tions over the course of 6 months, from a diverse population
(nearly 6,000 unique fingers compared to 400 in LiveDet).
The datasets in Tables 1 and 2 are further partitioned into
training, validation, and testing sets. Because our primary
objective is to evaluate cross-material performance (i.e. test
on spoofs fabricated from unseen spoof materials), we ran-
domly split our spoof materials into two partitions of 6 ma-
terials (unlike our algorithm, the binary-class baseline ne-
cessitates spoof training data). Then we evaluate our algo-
rithm and all baselines on each partition (Set1 and Set2)
separately (Table 3).
2.2. Preprocessing
Prior to training our proposed algorithm, we preprocess
the fingerprint images via a region of interest (ROI) extrac-
tion algorithm in order to simplify the learning task of the
GAN networks. The region of interest extraction also re-
moves noisy background details from the fingerprint im-
ages. Removing the noisy background information is im-
Figure 6. Preprocessing. A raw, direct-view fingerprint (a) is converted to grayscale and contrast enhanced (b). Next, the gradient image
(c) of (b) is computed using the Laplacian filter and smoothed into (d) using a gaussian filter. Finally, (d) is binarized into (e) and used to
locate centroids for cropping ROI patches from the 3 image outputs (direct-view, raw FTIR, and processed FTIR) of RaspiReader (f).
Table 3. Training, Validation, and Testing Dataset Splits
Live Impressions
Training and Validation
Location1
Testing
Location
#Training
Impressions
# Validation
Impressions
# Testing
Impressions
CU & JHUAPL MSU 8,330 500 3,050
Spoof Partition2
Set1
Training and Validation
Materials Testing Materials
#Training
Impressions
# Validation
Impressions
# Testing
Impressions
Dragonskin, Ecoflex,
Crayola Magic, 2D Paper,
Body Latex, Monster Latex
Gelatin, Playdoh,
Woodglue, Pigmented Ecoflex,
Gold Finger, Transparency
2,851 134 2,312
Spoof Partition
Set2
Training and Validation
Materials Testing Materials
#Training
Impressions
# Validation
Impressions
# Testing
Impressions
Gelatin, Playdoh,
Woodglue, Pigmented Ecoflex,
Gold Finger, Transparency
Dragonskin, Ecoflex,
Crayola Magic, 2D Paper,
Body Latex, Monster Latex
2,195 117 2,985
1 The location refers to the site at which the fingerprints were collected.
2 The 12 spoof materials were randomly split into two partitions. Only the binary-class baseline utilizes the spoof training data.
portant, since live fingerprints and spoof fingerprints will
have similar noise patterns in the background (especially in
the direct-view images) causing live and spoof images to
appear more similar. We validated this claim experimen-
tally, observing that the features were very similar for live
and spoof testing samples without preprocessing.
Given a set of three fingerprint images
{Idirect, Iraw, Iprocessed} from a single acquisition on
RaspiReader, we first find the ROI of the direct-view image
(Idirect). Then, a mapping is found between the ROI of
the direct-view image and the ROIs of the raw FTIR image
(Iraw) and processed FTIR image (Iprocessed).
To find the ROI of Idirect, we perform a num-
ber of conventional image processing operations.
First, Idirect (Fig. 6a) is converted to grayscale
and contrast enhanced via histogram equalization to
Idirect,contrast (Fig. 6b). Next, the gradient image of
Idirect,contrast is taken to highlight the fingerprint region
of interest from the background (Fig. 6c). Let this gradient
image be denoted as Idirect,gradient. The gradient image
is smoothed with a 30 × 30 gaussian filter (Fig. 6d),
binarized with an intensity threshold of 75, and de-noised
with the morphological operations of erosion and dila-
tion into Ibinary. Using Ibinary, we locate the centroid
(cdirect,x, cdirect,y) of the foreground “blob” with the
largest area. This centroid is then used as a center point
for our alignment window of size 768 × 768 (Fig. 6e).
Finally, a mapping is found between the direct-view ROI
computed in (Fig. 6e) and the ROIs of the raw FTIR and
processed FTIR images. The ROIs of all three images
{ROIdirect, ROIraw, ROIprocessed} after extraction and
resizing to 256 × 256 are shown in Figure 6f.
2.3. GAN Training
After extracting {ROIdirect, ROIraw, ROIprocessed}
from each image in our dataset, we train three GAN
networks, one for each of the RaspiReader image types
(Fig. 5). We select the DCGAN architecture proposed
in [14] because unlike other GANs, DCGAN includes a
classification loss for training the discriminator. This a nat-
ural choice for us, since our end goal is to use the trained
discriminator to classify between live fingerprints and spoof
fingerprints.
It is of utmost importance to note that each of the three
DCGANs (DC1, DC2, and DC3) used in our algorithm are
trained only on live fingerprint images. The learning objec-
tive of each GAN is as follows. (i) Each DCi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
is comprised of a generator Gi and a discriminator Di. (ii)
The generator Gi takes as input a random vector z ∈ R100
drawn from a standard multivariate distribution and outputs
a synthesized live fingerprint image. (iii) The discriminator
Di takes as input both real live fingerprint images and also
synthesized live fingerprint images output by the generator.
The discriminator then learns features which separate real
live fingerprint images from synthesized live fingerprint im-
ages. In this manner, the discriminator learns the features
that define real live fingerprint images; this is the ultimate
goal of our one-class spoof detection formulation.
More formally, the DCGAN is optimized in accordance
to the adversarial loss function in Equation 1 below.
Ladv(G,D) = Ex [logD(x)]+Ez [log(1−D(G(z)))] (1)
where G is the generator model, D is the discriminator
model, x is a sample from the real live distribution, and
z ∈ R100 is a vector drawn from a standard multivariate
distribution.
In our experiments, we modified DCGAN to take input
fingerprints of size 256 × 256 × 3 for the raw FTIR images
and the direct-view images and 256 × 256 × 1 for the pro-
cessed FTIR images (rather than the default5 input size of
64 × 64). This was accomplished by adding several convo-
lution layers. We further modified the discriminator to have
a fully connected layer, outputting compact feature repre-
sentations of length 128. In total, our modified discrimina-
tor architecture consists of 5 convolution layers (each hav-
ing 5 × 5 filters and a stride of 2), an average pooling layer,
and two fully connected layers (128-dimensional for fea-
ture representation, followed by 1-dimensional for sigmoid
classification layer). Every convolution layer is followed by
Leaky Relu activation. Additionally, group normalization
is performed after every convolution layer except the first.
We found that batch normalization resulted in very unstable
spoof detection performance, which was significantly stabi-
lized using group normalization. We note that we also ex-
perimented with deeper state-of-the-art architectures for the
discriminator such as MobileNet [15], however, the genera-
tor did not converge with deeper discriminator models. We
train our GANS with a batch size of 64, a learning rate of
0.0002, and the Adam optimizer.
Note that while we do not use any spoof data to train
the GAN network, we do use a small subset of spoofs as a
validation set (Table 3) to determine when to stop the GAN
5https://github.com/carpedm20/DCGAN-tensorflow
network training. In this manner, we do make use of the
available spoof impressions, rather than neglecting valuable
data. At the same time, since we do not use the spoof data
for training (only for validation) we avoid the risks of over-
fitting to spoofs made from a specific subset of materials (as
binary classifiers are prone to). Furthermore, the validation
set is comprised of a very small number of spoofs (≈ 120
impressions), inline with a secondary goal of our approach,
namely to develop a spoof detector which does not necessi-
tate the laborious task of creating and imaging an inordinate
number of spoofs.
Finally, we also experimented with (i) minutiae patch
based GANS (i.e. the input to the GAN network was minu-
tiae patches extracted from the region of interest in each
image), and (ii) Variational Auto-Encoder anomaly detec-
tors trained on the region of interests from each image (i.e.
the reconstruction error of the VAE was used as an anomaly
score). Both of these models are fused into our final score.
2.4. Score Fusion
During testing, the generator of each GAN is discarded
and the discriminators are used for spoof detection. In
particular, given three images {Idirect, Iraw, Iprocessed}
from a single RaspiReader acquisition, three scores
{sdirect, sraw, sprocessed} are obtained from DC1, DC2,
and DC3, respectively (Fig. 5). We further obtain a score
spatches from the discriminator of a DCGAN trained on the
raw FTIR minutiae-based patches of RaspiReader, and svae
an anomaly score obtained from a VAE trained on the direct
view images of RaspiReader. Then, a final spoof detection
score sf is computed as the average of the five scores.
We also experimented with training different one-class
classifiers such as One-Class SVMs [9, 16] and Gaussian
Mixture Models [17] on top of the 128-dimensional features
extracted by the discriminators given their prior use in fin-
gerprint and face spoof detection, but found no performance
improvement over directly using the sigmoid output of the
discriminators.
3. Experimental Results
Our experimental results aim to demonstrate the superior
cross material performance of our proposed one-class spoof
detector in comparison to state-of-the-art one-class spoof
detectors and binary-class spoof detectors. Note that, our
proposed algorithm and the baseline one-class spoof detec-
tor proposed in [9] do not use spoof data for training, but do
use the validation spoof data listed in Table 3 to determine
when to stop training and / or tune hyper-parameters during
a validation phase. In contrast, the binary-class baseline
algorithm in [10] requires spoof data for training.
We also note that we slightly modified [9] in order to
boost its performance to make for a fair comparison with
our proposed algorithm. In particular, the algorithm in [9]
Table 4. True Detection Rates (TDR) for Individual Testing Materials from Spoof Partition Set1 and Set2 (FDR = 0.2%)
Set1
Algorithm Gelatin Pigmented Playdoh Woodglue Transparency Gold Finger
Texture + OCSVM [9] 0.0% 2.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9%
Binary CNN [10] 67.7% 29.4% 6.0% 55.7% 34.0% 11.8%
Proposed 1-class GANs 74.5% 22.3% 96.3% 85.2% 94.0% 39.2%
Set2
Algorithm Dragonskin Ecoflex Monster Latex Crayola Magic Body Latex 2D Paper
Texture + OCSVM [9] 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 15.0% 20.6% 33.8%
Binary CNN [10] 49.0% 39.3% 54.3% 78.1% 12.1% 46.1%
Proposed 1-class GANs 2.1% 4.8% 38.5% 83.6% 0.3% 56.8%
Table 5. Speed Comparison of Spoof Detectors
Algorithm OCSVM [9] CNN [10] Proposed
Time (ms) 1,914 472 778
1 Computed on 2.9 GHz i5 with 8 GB of RAM
extracted 5 different textural features from grayscale pro-
cessed FTIR images to train 5 one-class support vector
machines (OCSVMs) for one-class spoof detection. Since
RaspiReader outputs 3 images, we extract the same 5 tex-
tural features used in [9] but from all 3 images. In total
then we trained 15 OCSVMs (3 images and 5 OCSVMs
per image) and fused their scores. Also, since RaspiReader
outputs RGB images, rather than extracting grayscale tex-
tural features as was done in [9], we extract color-textural
features (i.e. the texture feature is extracted from all 3 chan-
nels and concatenated into a final feature vector) from the
raw FTIR and direct-view images. Making these modifi-
cations increased the computational time of the algorithm
(Table 5), but boosted the spoof detection performance in
all scenarios.
3.1. Analysis
For 11 of the 12 spoof materials (Table 4), our pro-
posed algorithm outperforms the one-class baseline algo-
rithm from [9] and for 7 of the 12 spoof materials our
algorithm outperforms the binary-class baseline algorithm
from [10]. The average spoof detection performance of
our proposed algorithm across all twelve of the materials
is TDR = 49.8% compared to that of the best baseline
algorithm (binary-CNN) at TDR = 40.3%.
The baseline algorithm proposed in [9] performs very
poorly in all testing scenarios. While the classification ac-
curacy for some materials using [9] was only slightly lower
than the classification accuracy reported in [9], the TDR
at the fixed operating of FDR = 0.2% was significantly
lower6. This demonstrates that the handcrafted textural
features used by the authors in [9] are not discriminative
enough for training one-class classifiers for state-of-the-art
spoof detection. In contrast, the deep features extracted by
our proposed approach are discriminative enough to sep-
arate live and spoof fingerprints, even when training with
only live fingerprints (Fig. 9).
6FDR = 0.2% is the IARPA ODIN specified threshold.
(a) (b)
Figure 7. Green playdoh finger direct-image (a); gold finger direct-
image (b). Even though qualitatively these images look very dif-
ferent from live fingers, the binary classifier which has not seen
playdoh or gold finger during training misclassifies them as live
fingers. In contrast, our proposed GANs are able to easily reject
these very anomalous spoofs.
(a) (b)
Figure 8. Live finger direct-image (a); ecoflex finger direct-image
(b). Both baselines as well as our GANs struggle to distinguish
clear spoofs like ecoflex from live fingers, since much of the live
finger can be seen from behind the spoof.
Next, we note that the binary-CNN baseline perfor-
mance is lower than the cross material performance reported
in [10]. We posit this is for several reasons. First, the results
in [10] are reported on a much smaller dataset (7 materials
vs. 12, 15 live subjects vs. 585). Furthermore, the cross-
material results in [10] are reported by leaving only a single
material out of training, followed by testing on one withheld
material. In contrast the current evaluation protocol only al-
lows training on half of the 12 materials and performs test-
ing on the withheld half. Finally, the results reported in [10]
were at a FDR of 1.0% which is more lenient than the 0.2%
Figure 9. 2D t-SNE visualization of the 384-dimensional (128 fea-
tures for each model) live and spoof representations extracted by
our three GANS from the live testing data and spoof testing data
from partition Set1. The most difficult material from Set1, pig-
mented ecoflex, shares some overlap with the live distribution.
operating point in the current evaluation.
What is more interesting to note about the cross-material
performance of the binary-CNN is that in some cases, the
unseen testing spoof materials such as playdoh (Fig. 7a)
or gold finger (Fig. 7b) visually look very dissimilar from
live fingerprint images (Fig. 8a). However, since the binary-
CNN has not seen the material during training, it frequently
misclassifies what intuitively seems like an easy material to
classify. In contrast, our proposed GANs can perform very
well on materials that look very anomalous such as playdoh
and gold fingers (Fig. 9).
Finally, we acknowledge that the proposed spoof detec-
tion system still leaves room for improvement on transpar-
ent spoof materials. Indeed, transparent spoofs were also
reported as the most challenging materials in [10] due to
the fact that much of the live finger color transmits through
the clear spoof materials (Fig. 8).
4. Summary
We have introduced a novel one-class classifier built
from the discriminators of GAN networks trained on only
live fingerprint images for fingerprint spoof detection. We
have bested state-of-the-art one-class and binary-class spoof
detection algorithms on a large, diverse, and challenging
dataset collected with the open source RaspiReader [10].
Our ongoing research is investigating the fusion of two-
class spoof detectors with one-class spoof detectors, fol-
lowed by further cross-material evaluation.7
7This research was supported by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity
(IARPA), via IARPA R&D Contract No. 2017 - 17020200004. The views
and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not
be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either ex-
pressed or implied, of ODNI, IARPA, or the U.S. Government. The U.S.
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